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Emissions Targets and the Real Business Cycle:  
Intensity Targets versus Caps or Taxes  
Carolyn Fischer and Michael R. Springborn 
Abstract 
For reducing greenhouse gas emissions, intensity targets are attracting interest as a flexible 
mechanism that would better allow for economic growth than emissions caps. For the same expected 
emissions, however, the economic responses to unexpected productivity shocks differ. Using a real 
business cycle model, we find that a cap dampens the effects of productivity shocks in the economy. An 
emissions tax leads to the same expected outcomes as a cap but with greater volatility. Certainty-
equivalent intensity targets maintain higher levels of labor, capital, and output than other policies, with 
lower expected costs and no more volatility than with no policy. 
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Emissions Targets and the Real Business Cycle:  
Intensity Targets versus Caps or Taxes  
Carolyn Fischer and Michael R. Springborn∗ 
Introduction 
Even though consensus has grown on the need for dramatic reductions in anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), which contribute to global climate change, considerable 
debate continues on which policies would best serve that goal. Many academics argue for carbon 
taxes as the most efficient domestic and global mechanism (Aldy et al. 2008), but few 
governments are seriously considering a carbon tax as a primary policy for slowing GHG 
emissions. Many countries, including those of the European Union, have committed to or are 
proposing caps on GHG emissions. Other countries, including Canada, are instead pursuing 
intensity targets, which are also the basis for some prominent proposals to include developing 
countries in a global framework (Herzog et al. 2006). These targets would index emissions 
allowance allocations to economic output, the idea being that a flexible mechanism would better 
allow for economic growth (e.g., Pizer 2005).   
How much of a boon is this flexibility? From a policy design standpoint, one could 
equivalently assign caps that follow a growth path or assign declining intensity targets or carbon 
taxes to meet a cap. Therefore, a growth path is not an inherent feature of intensity targets, nor is 
a fixed emissions path a defining characteristic of emissions caps. Furthermore, when the 
ultimate goal is reducing overall emissions and stabilizing atmospheric concentrations, any 
policy would have to be ratcheted over time. However, in the face of uncertain economic growth, 
the policies offer different qualities. Holding expected allocations constant, intensity and 
emissions targets are likely to provoke different economic responses to unexpected productivity 
shocks. This paper explores the impacts of such economy-wide emissions regulations on the 
business cycle.  
                                                 
∗ Carolyn Fischer is a senior fellow at Resources for the Future; fischer@rff.org. Michael R. Springborn is an 
assistant professor in the Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California, Davis. The 
authors are grateful for the support of EPA/STAR (grant RD 83099101) and NSF/IGERT (Program grant DGE-
0114437). Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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A long literature in environmental economics, beginning with Weitzman’s seminal 1974 
paper, has compared price and quantity instruments for regulating emissions. More recently, 
researchers have begun to also compare intensity-based instruments. Several of these latter 
works, including Newell and Pizer (2008) and Quirion (2005), follow the partial equilibrium 
approach of Weitzman. Others have taken a general equilibrium approach, focusing on the role 
of tax interactions (Goulder et al. 1999; Parry and Williams 1999), the role of multisector and 
international trade (Dissou 2005; Jotzo and Pezzey 2007),1 or both (Fischer and Fox 2007). 
Given that uncertainty about economic growth and the macroeconomic transition effects of 
carbon policy is driving interest in indexed emissions targets, surprisingly few studies address 
these aspects directly.  Much of the previous theoretical analysis of intensity targets and 
alternative instruments has focused on variance in abatement and compliance costs as the critical 
metric.  This literature, including Kolstad (2005), Quirion (2005), Pizer (2005), Jotzo and Pezzey 
(2007),  and a pre-publication version of  Sue Wing et al. (2009), is reviewed by Peterson (2008) 
who observes that a common thread is the importance of the correlation between GDP and 
emissions in determining whether abatement cost uncertainty is lower under an intensity target. 
This paper takes a broader approach, characterizing the response in a set of macro-level variables 
to economy-wide emissions regulations via price, quantity, and intensity instruments, operating 
in the context of an uncertain business cycle.  
In contrast to the preceding prices-versus-quantities literature, we use a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to compare the dynamic effects of these policy 
choices under productivity shocks. We specify a dynamic Robinson Crusoe economy, with 
choices over consumption, labor, capital investment, and a polluting intermediate good. We 
consider three policies for constraining emissions from the polluting factor: an emissions cap, an 
emissions tax, and an intensity target that sets a maximum emissions-output ratio. The economy 
is subject to uncertain shocks to overall productivity. We start with a simple approach to 
characterizing the response by solving analytically for the steady state following a single, 
permanent shock; this is our SS model. To implement the full real business cycle, RBC model, 
we specify a productivity factor that evolves according to a first-order autoregressive process, 
                                                 
1 Jensen and Rasmussen (2000) consider using a general equilibrium model of the Danish economy and find that 
allocating emissions permits according to output dampens sectoral adjustment but imposes greater welfare costs than 
grandfathered permits. Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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which includes i.i.d. random shocks each period. To solve the RBC model numerically, we 
parameterize the model with plausible values from the macroeconomics literature.  
Our analysis and an unpublished work by Heutel (2008) are the first attempts of which 
we are aware to examine climate policy in an RBC framework—that is, in a DSGE model with 
uncertainty over future productivity. Heutel’s focus is on the optimal dynamic tax or quota 
policy, which adjusts each period in response to income and price effects. Heutel finds that price 
effect dominates, driving increased emissions levels and prices during economic expansions. Our 
approach differs in that we compare the performance of three instruments (tax, cap, and intensity 
target) in each set to achieve an exogenous and fixed level of expected emissions reduction. 
Whereas we account for labor market responses to policy and productivity shifts and abstract 
from considering direct damages from emissions, Heutel sets aside labor fluctuations to 
concentrate on the interesting dynamics of the optimal endogenous policy.2 We incorporate labor 
for two main reasons. First, since labor market impacts are often highlighted in environmental 
policy debates, labor is a critical outcome variable in its own right. Second, as we will further 
discuss in the results below, the dynamic impulse response of labor to a productivity shock in the 
full RBC model is, uniquely, not single-peaked. Our analytical results for variable levels in the 
SS model and expected variable levels in the RBC model tell the same story. Implementation of 
any of the three instruments leads all variable levels to fall, except under the intensity target 
policy where labor remains unchanged from the no policy setting. This particular consistency 
occurs because adjustments in response to the intensity target policy in consumption and 
production exactly offset within the labor optimality condition. In a comparison of levels under 
the three instruments, we find that deterministic outcomes under the cap and tax policies are 
identical and, aside from emissions, lower than those of the intensity target. Thus, given an 
identical emissions reduction constraint, total output is higher with the intensity target than with 
the cap or tax. This arises because additional production under the intensity target earns 
additional permits, increasing the returns to production. Consequently, the emissions intensity 
target must be set below the emissions intensity observed under the cap and tax policies. 
Considering volatility, the SS model reveals that the sensitivity of output to a particular 
productivity shock is dampened by the cap. Similarly, when stochastic productivity shocks are 
incorporated in the RBC analysis, the cap policy leads to the lowest levels of volatility for each 
                                                 
2 Other modeling differences lie in the representation of abatement opportunties. Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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variable and therefore minimal variation in production and utility as well. The tax policy has the 
opposite effect. Optimal investment under the tax policy is much more sensitive to deviations in 
the productivity factor than under any other policy. Not surprisingly then, the volatility of each 
variable, and ultimately production and utility is greatest under the tax. Meanwhile, the 
sensitivity to shocks under the intensity target is unchanged from the no policy case.  
Deterministic Model 
Although the issues at play involve economic growth and uncertainty, much of the 
intuition regarding the policy differences can first be derived from a simple, deterministic model 
without growth, by looking at the steady-state responses to different emissions policies and 
degrees of a one-time productivity shock. Consider a simple Robinson-Crusoe economy. Let C 
be the consumption good, K be capital, L be labor, l be leisure, and M be a polluting intermediate 
good. The representative agent gets utility u(C,l) from consumption and leisure. Total production 
Y is a function of capital, labor and polluting inputs  (, ,) FKML, adjusted by a productivity 
factor Θ with an expected value of 1, where  (, ,) YF K M L = Θ . Capital depreciates at rate δ  
and is augmented with investment I, so  1 (1 ) tt KI K δ + = +− . Total output is allocated between 
consumption, investment and intermediate inputs (CIMY + +≤ ), and time is allocated 
between leisure and labor ( 1 lL =−). Emissions are assumed to be proportional to the use of M 
and units of emissions are chosen such that the quantity of emissions is equal to M.3 For the 
remainder of the analysis we will refer to the level of the intermediate polluting good and the 
level of emissions interchangeably. The emissions constraint requires that  ( ) t M AY ≤ , where 
(.) t A  is the permit allocation, which may vary over time and with output. 
We assume the specific functional forms of log utility and Cobb-Douglas constant returns 
to scale technology: 
ln ln( ) tt uC l ω =+  
 
1 (, ,) tt t tt t FKM L K M L
α γα γ − − =  
The Lagrangian for the constrained utility maximization problem is 
                                                 
3 We abstract from economic growth, and we also ignore the implications of improvements in abatement 
technology. We will relax this assumption when considering an extension incorporating growth in our sensitivity 
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where At,Y represents the derivative of At with respect to Y. 
Further substituting and rearranging, we determine expressions for capital, emissions, and 
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with output being determined in equilibrium with the policy constraint, Equation (7). Note that 
z=L/(1-L) is a monotonic, increasing, and convex function of L. 

















Note that for the cap, 
cap ˆ /1 tt m φγ =− ; since emissions are fixed, the price adjusts to the 
level of output. For the tax, this shadow value is fixed by the policy. With the intensity target 
(IT),  , tY A μ =  and  t m μ = , meaning the shadow value is also fixed, albeit at a different (higher) 
level, which we will discuss next:  ˆ (/ 1 ) / ( 1 )
IT
t φγ μ γ = −− . 
Let us now abstract from the path dynamics and focus on the steady state, with 
1 tt CC C + == , etc. (steady-state levels will be denoted by the absence of a time index) and the 
shadow values growing at the rate of time preference. (The Lagrange multipliers  t λ  and  t φ  are 
present value multipliers; when solving for steady-state values, the current value multipliers will 
be constant, as will the ratio of the present value multipliers, φ ˆ.) Let  ˆ 1/( ) r β δ ≡ + .  Steady-state 
equilibrium levels are given by  
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With these general results, we now turn to evaluating the effects of specific emissions 
policy choices. 
No Policy 
As an initial benchmark, consider the absence of an emissions policy. Without any 
regulation, we can drop the constraint on emissions, so  0 φ = . Simplifying the above equations, 
we have  ˆ k βα = , m γ = ,  ˆ 1 c γ βδα =−− , and 
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; that is, the elasticity of output is greater than one.  
Note that in the absence of an emissions policy, the steady-state GDP shares of 
consumption, capital, and emissions are invariant to the shock variable. Therefore, their levels 
will all vary in a positive manner with permanent productivity shocks, proportional to 




Meanwhile, total labor supply in the steady state is uniquely indifferent to the shock parameter, 
since the effect of increased marginal productivity of labor is exactly offset by the falling 
marginal value of income, λ (see Equations (2) and (5)). 
Intensity Target  
Consider next an intensity target of μ  per unit of output, so  ( ) AY Y μ = . We assume a 
binding target, which implies m μ γ =<. Furthermore, in equilibrium, A=M. 
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Thus, we observe again that steady-state consumption, capital, and emissions shares of 
GDP are invariant to permanent productivity shocks (the latter by definition). Their levels are 
then all procyclical, in the sense of responding in the same direction as the change in the 
productivity factor. Labor supply is also invariant, both to shocks and to the policy stringency, 
since the effects filter through the change in the marginal productivity of labor (to produce final 
output and additional permits) and the marginal value of income, which offset. Consequently, we 
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Interestingly, capital as a share of output is increasing with the stringency of the 
emissions constraint. The reason is that additional investment and production also produce 
additional emissions allocations. The rate of consumption also increases with policy stringency, 
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= , and 
/ mM Y = . We see that the capital share is constant and identical to the no-policy case, also 
implying it is strictly lower than that under the intensity target. Labor supply also carries the 
same relationship to the consumption rate as in the no-policy case. 
On the other hand, we also see that the effective shadow price of emissions is no longer 
independent of the productivity variable, but rather procyclical:  






= −  (16) 
In other words, a positive productivity shock, which would otherwise increase emissions, raises 
the price of emissions permits to maintain the cap. As a result, consumption as a share of GDP 
reacts in a procyclical manner, since the cap prevents additional output from being used as more 
of the intermediate good:  ˆ 1/ cM Y δβα =− − . 












. The increase in the marginal productivity 
of labor from a positive productivity shock, dampened under the cap constraint, is no longer 
strong enough to offset the decrease in the marginal value of income, so labor falls under the cap.  
Substituting these values and solving for production, we get 
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− −− − =Θ . Overall, steady-state production under the cap is less sensitive to a 
given permanent productivity shock than in the preceding scenarios, both since labor supply is 
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Emissions Tax 
Suppose that instead of emissions trading, we have a fixed price, as with a carbon tax, 
with the revenues rebated in lump-sum fashion to the representative consumer. Let this price be 
fixed, so  ˆ φ τ =  (i.e., the tax is fixed in terms of the marginal value of income). The new problem 
is similar to the grandfathering problem, in which the permits are allocated lump-sum, with 
0 MKL AAA === . But in this case, the equilibrium value of the allocation equals the emissions 
tax revenues; that is,  A M τ τ = . 























= . With the emissions price fixed, labor supply and the consumption, capital, and 
emissions intensities are all invariant to productivity changes, as in the no-policy and intensity 
target scenarios.  
Summary and Comparison 
A summary of analytical results is presented in Table 1 so that the policy effects can be 
seen side-by-side. First, it is useful to compare outcomes under certainty, with  1 Θ= . In this 
case, we notice that the emissions tax achieving the same emissions as the cap will replicate all 
the same prices and quantities as the cap. The intensity target, on the other hand, has important 
differences: the capital share is higher (since (1 )/(1 ) 1 μ γ − −> ), and the labor allocation is also 
higher (since  m γ >  when emissions are constrained). Given the same total emissions target, 
then, with the other factors of production being larger, it must be that total output is higher with 
the intensity target than with the cap or tax. As a consequence, the emissions intensity target 
must be lower than the emissions rate under the other policies to achieve the same level of total 
emissions.4 We also observe that the consumption rate is higher with the intensity target than 
with no policy, but it is unclear whether it is higher than with the cap or tax policies. 
                                                 
4 These results echo those in static models, such as Fischer (2003) and Fischer and Fox (2007). Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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Table 1. Comparison of Analytical Results 
  No Policy   Intensity Target  Emissions Cap  Emissions Tax 
m 












ˆ 1 γ βδα −−   ()
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Other differences arise in response to innovations in the productivity parameter. Under 
the emissions cap, obviously, emissions are fixed, and output is less responsive to a shock than 
the other policies because of a countercyclical effect on labor supply and emissions intensity.  
An important caveat in thinking about the effect of productivity shocks is that the steady-
state analysis considers a permanent productivity shock, as opposed to transitory ones. A 
permanent change in productivity has the same (procyclical) effect on output, in percentage 
terms, in all but the emissions cap policy. The other steady-state variables remain constant as a 
share of output; their levels are then procyclical in the same percentage terms as output. 
However, as we will see in the next section, these results do not hold along a path with stochastic 
productivity, when shocks are transitory and their cumulative effect is also manifested in the 
capital stock responses. We now turn to a numerical version of the model, incorporating a 
stochastic process into the overall productivity factor. Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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Numerical Model with Stochastic Productivity Shocks 
Numerical Solution and Simulation Method 
Because of the nonlinear form of the first-order conditions, specifically the intertemporal 
Euler and labor equations, we turn to a numerical method to calculate a first-order approximation 
to the equilibrium conditions. To begin, we parameterize the model using standard calculations 
from the real business cycle (RBC) literature and our own analyses (see Table 2).  For 
production parameters we start with King, Plosser, and Rebelo’s (1988) (hereafter KPR) 
calculation of mean annual share of GNP to labor (verified with current data). We decompose the 
total capital share of output in our model into energy inputs, M (to represent the intermediate 
polluting good), and all other nonenergy capital, K. The baseline share of energy to output is set 
equal to the mean ratio of annual energy expenditures to GDP. Finally, the share of nonenergy 
capital to output is set equal to one minus the labor and energy shares. The utility parameter, 
discount factor, and depreciation rates all reflect standard RBC model assumptions.  
The productivity factor is given by Θt = exp(zt), where zt evolves according to a 
stationary, first-order autoregressive process, 
 
  t t t z z ε η + = −1  (17) 
and where εt is an i.i.d. normal random variable with a mean of zero and standard deviation σ. 
Parameters of the productivity factor process approximately follow Prescott (1986) and much of 
the subsequent macroeconomic literature.   
Given these parameter values, we linearize the efficiency conditions by taking a first-
order Taylor approximation around the steady-state levels of our variables. Using a standard 
eigenvalue decomposition method, we then solve for the decision functions that take the state 
variables (K and Θ) at the beginning of the period and return the optimal levels of C, M, L, and 
capital investment.5  
To characterize the variance of the variables of interest, we simulate 1,000 realizations, 
each 100 years in length. In each simulation the initial capital stock is set to its steady-state level 
                                                 
5 Note that this is a constrained optimum subject to the relaxation of linearizing the equilibrium conditions, and 
hence the decision rules, around the steady state.   Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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for the particular policy setting, and the productivity factor is set to one. Subsequently, the 
economy is subjected to a new shock each period, after which optimal decisions are made over 
the choice variables.  
As a robustness check, we also modify the model with a labor-enhancing productivity 
factor and perform the same analysis in the context of exogenous growth in the baseline. The 
results, viewing the variables as shares of output along the growth path, are essentially identical 
to those in the no-growth case, so we concentrate our reporting on the latter case. 
Table 2. Summary of Simulation Parameter Values and Sources 
Parameter Level  Source 
1 – α – γ  Share of output going to L  0.58  Mean annual ratio of total employee 
compensation to GNP (KPR 1988 for 1948–
1985, same result calculated for 1970–2001 
using data from NIPA 2005)  
γ  Share of output going to M  0.09  Mean ratio of total energy expenditures to 
GDP (1970–2001), data from EIA 2004  
  Conventional share of output 
going to total capital  
(in models without M) 
0.42  Calculated as one minus the share to L 
α   Share of output going to K   0.33  Conventional share to total capital less share 
to energy capital 
ω  Utility parameter  0.2  From KPR 1988, chosen indirectly by 
specifying steady-state hours worked (0.20) 
based on the average fraction of hours 
devoted to market work in 1948-1985  
β  Discount factor  0.95  From KPR 1988, consistent with the 
observed average real return to equity, 
1948–1981 
δ  Depreciation rate  0.096  Calculated assuming an investment-output 
ratio of 25% and a capital stock-output ratio 
of 2.6 
η  Autocorrelation parameter  0.81  Annual analog of the quarterly rate of 0.95 
(Prescott 1986) 
σ  Standard deviation of random 
parameter εt 
0.014  Annual analog of the quarterly level of 
0.007 (Prescott 1986) 
 
Results for the Deterministic Case 
With this parameterization, we begin by numerically solving for steady-state values in the 
deterministic case (Θ =1), which reproduces the analytical approach above with no shocks. After 
calculating the benchmark case of No Policy, we consider the three policy scenarios—Intensity Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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Target, Emissions Cap, and Emissions Tax—and solve for the level of stringency such that all 
meet the same emissions reductions (20 percent) as in the deterministic steady-state. 
The results are reported here and in Tables 3 and 4. In the absence of uncertainty, there is 
no difference between the cap and the tax, as one would expect. The intensity target, on the other 
hand, requires a more stringent intensity level than the other policies, and it also results in a 17 
percent higher permit price. On the other hand, consistent with the analytical results, it generates 
no decrease in employment and increases capital as a share of output. Although the consumption 
share is higher, total consumption is slightly lower. When we consider a single period at the new 
steady state under a policy, the welfare costs, in terms of changes in utility, of reaching the 
emissions reduction goal with the intensity target are less than those with the cap or the tax 
policy.6 However, the transition dynamics in reaching that new steady state differ. The new 
steady-state capital level for the cap and tax is lower than for the intensity target—under the 
latter two policies there is a longer period of relaxed investment and labor and elevated 
consumption along the transition to the new steady state. From a present value of utility 
perspective, the cap and tax then dominate the intensity target. There is yet a further difference in 
the transition properties of the cap and tax. Once the cap is imposed, the new steady-state level 
for M is achieved immediately. The tax, which is set to achieve the same level for M at the 
deterministic steady state, results in emissions above the cap level, while the capital stock is 
above the steady state. (The same is true for the intensity target but to a much lesser extent.) In a 
present value analysis, the tax policy then dominates, though it should be acknowledged that this 
is made possible by elevated emissions that are not accounted for in the utility function.  
Recall from the analytical SS model results (Table 1) that whether the consumption share 
under the intensity target was greater than for the cap and tax policies was ambiguous. Given our 
model parameters, we see that the intensity target consumption share is lower, since the 
proportional increase in production, relative to the cap or tax, outweighs the same in 
consumption.  
                                                 
6 Utility levels exclude damages from emissions, but since emissions are equal across the policy scenarios, that 
doesn’t change the relative evaluation. Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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Table 3. Deterministic Steady-State Consumption, Capital, and Emissions Shares  
   c L/Y  k m 
No Policy   0.697  0.923  2.22  0.0900 
Intensity Target  0.709  0.943  2.26  0.0735 
Cap 0.712  0.951  2.22  0.0745 
Tax 0.712  0.951  2.22  0.0745 
 
Table 4. Steady-State Levels in the Deterministic Case, with Percentage  
Changes Relative to No Policy 
   C L K  M  Y  U 
No Policy (NP)  0.609  0.806  1.94  0.079  0.87  –0.825 
change from NP  0% 0% 0%  0%  0%     
Intensity Target  0.607  0.806  1.93  0.063  0.86  –0.828 
change from NP  –0.3% 0.00% –0.3%  –20.0%  –2.1%     
Cap 0.602  0.803  1.88  0.063  0.84  –0.833 
change from NP  –1.1% –0.43%  –3.3%  –20.0% –3.3%     
Tax 0.602  0.803  1.88  0.063  0.84  –0.833 
change from NP  –1.1% –0.43%  –3.3%  –20.0% –3.3%     
 
Results with Stochastic Productivity 
Next, to evaluate the effects of uncertainty and volatility in the productivity parameter, 
we solve for the optimal linearized decision functions, presented in Table 5. These functions map 
the state variables (K and Θ) into investment, consumption, and labor choices. The decision rules 
are calculated in terms of proportional deviation from steady state (PDSS).7 For example, the 
PDSS of the capital stock in period t+1 under no policy is given by 
' ' '
1 * 3372 . 0 * 8594 . 0 t t t K K θ + = + . 
The decision functions were used to conduct 1,000 stochastic 100-year simulations for each 
emission policy. In Figure 1 we present example output under the four policies for a 30-period 
segment of one simulation. The stochastic productivity factor path is shown in the first panel, 
and the remaining panels depict the response in production, polluting input, and utility.  
                                                 
7 For example, if the steady-state level of capital is given by K
§
, then K’t = (K’t – K
§)/K
§. Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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Figure 1. Variable Outcomes under No Policy (NP), Intensity Target (IT), Cap, and Tax, 
Given Path of Productivity Factor θ. Levels are normalized by the NP steady-state level 
for Y, M, and U.  
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Our findings are summarized in two key statistics for each variable, reported in Table 6. 
First, we present the mean of the simulation means (i.e., we take the mean of each simulation 
time path and then take the mean over all 1,000 simulations). Comparison with Table 4 shows 
that the variable central tendencies are virtually identical to the deterministic steady-state levels, 
as expected. Second, we report the mean simulation standard deviation (in percentage terms) as a 
measure of expected volatility for any given realization of productivity shocks (i.e., for any time 
path).  Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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Table 5. Decision Functions for Choice Variables in Terms of  
Proportional Deviation from Steady State  
 
 
Table 6. Simulation Central Tendencies and Variability 
      Variable 
Policy Statistic  C L K M θ Y  UP - UNP 
*** 
No Policy  msm*  0.609  0.806  1.94  0.079  1  0.87  0 
  msstd** 2.50% 0.27% 3.09% 3.32% 2.25% 3.32%  0.0242 
            
Intensity 
Target 
msm 0.607  0.806  1.93  0.063  Same  0.86 –0.00322 
msstd  2.50% 0.27% 3.09% 3.32%    3.32%  0.0242 
            
Cap msm  0.602  0.803  1.88  0.063  Same  0.84  –0.00810 
  msstd  2.43% 0.22% 2.86% 0.00%    2.94%  0.0239 
            
Tax msm  0.602  0.803  1.88  0.063  Same  0.84  –0.00813 
    msstd  2.52% 0.27% 3.14% 3.34%      3.40%  0.0244 
*Mean of simulation means (msm): the mean over 1,000 simulations of the 100-year simulation mean.  
**Mean of simulation standard deviations (msstd): the mean over 1,000 simulations of the simulation 
standard deviations, in percentage terms (except for last column). 
***Under UP - UNP, msm is calculated over the deviation of utility under the given policy from the no policy 
baseline. The statistic msstd is calculated for levels of Up only.  
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The expected levels in the RBC model tell the same story as the analytical results for 
variable levels in the SS model and the deterministic case. Implementation of any of the three 
instruments leads all variable levels to fall except under the intensity target policy, where labor 
remains unchanged from the no policy setting. This particular consistency occurs because 
adjustments in response to the intensity target policy in consumption and investment exactly 
offset within the labor optimality condition. As expected from the deterministic analysis, we find 
that expected levels under the cap and tax policies are identical and lower than those of the 
intensity target. Thus, given an identical emissions reduction constraint, total output is higher 
with the intensity target than with the cap or tax. Consequently, we again see that the emissions 
intensity target must be set below the emissions rate observed under the cap and tax policies.  
We find that utility at the steady state is the same under a cap or tax, and lower than for 
utility under an intensity target (see Table 4). These results are essentially maintained in the 
setting with stochastic productivity shocks (see Table 6). Even though the average sacrifice in 
utility for a period (the mean of simulation means) from adopting the cap policy (lowest 
volatility) is slightly smaller than for the tax policy (highest volatility), we are not able to reject 
that the means are equal using the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (p = 0.20).  
Since optimal capital stock levels are lower under emissions constraints, there is a period 
of transition from the initial no policy state. Utility under the cap and tax policies is actually 
greater over this period of transition because investment levels are deflated to a larger extent than 
under the intensity target. The effect of this investment “holiday” is strong enough that the 
intensity target actually performs the worst from a present value of utility perspective. This result 
will be sensitive to the assumed 5 percent discount rate and 100-year time horizon of our 
analysis. Consistent with the observation that there is greater flexibility under the tax to take 
advantage of elevated capital levels over the transition period, we find that the present value of 
utility under the tax is significantly greater than for the cap (p < 0.001).8     
 Considering volatility, in general, in both the single permanent shock (SS) and repeated 
transitory shock (RBC) settings, the variables of interest (emissions, consumption, capital, and 
labor) are procyclical under each policy; that is, they move in the same direction as the level of 
the productivity shock. The exceptions are emissions under the cap, which are fixed, and labor. 
                                                 
8 Note that in taking advantage of elevated capital levels over the transition to the new steady state, the tax policy 
will result in greater emissions than the cap policy, an effect that is not incorporated into the utility function.  Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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Labor is invariant to shocks in the SS setting, except under a cap, in which case it is 
countercyclical. In perhaps the starkest divergence between the two settings, the RBC response 
of labor is procyclical for all policies. This result is explored further below.   
Otherwise, the SS results are qualitatively maintained in the RBC setting. In the SS 
model the sensitivity of output to a particular productivity shock is dampened by the cap. 
Similarly, from the RBC analysis, Table 6 reveals that the emissions cap, which by definition has 
the least volatility in emissions, also has the least volatility in output and all the other variables, 
including utility. When productivity is high, the shadow value of the fixed emissions constraint 
becomes greater, putting the brakes on the economy, and when productivity is low, the effective 
permit price drops, easing up on the economy. 
The tax policy has the opposite effect in the RBC setting. Optimal investment under the 
tax policy is more sensitive to productivity factor deviation than under any other policy. This is 
evident in the optimal linear decision functions for choice variables from Table 5. The 
coefficient representing the effect of deviation in the productivity factor on next period’s capital 
is largest for the tax.  This sensitivity to stochastic productivity is born out dynamically in 
simulations: the volatility of each variable, and ultimately production and utility, is greatest 
under the tax (see Table 6). The intensity target, on the other hand, does not change the 
sensitivity of the economy to productivity shocks: the decision functions for no policy and 
intensity target are identical and lead to a level of volatility that lies between the cap and tax.  
A salient feature of generalizing the SS model to a setting of repeated transitory shocks is 
that the optimal decision in a time period is taken with respect to the current capital stock as well 
as the current level of the productivity shock. The capital stock is essentially continually 
divergent from the steady state and reflects the cumulative response to the series of shock levels 
encountered up to the present period. Since investment is procyclical, a positive deviation from 
the steady state roughly reflects a history that, on balance, featured positive productivity shock 
levels.  
Given that background, we now return to the question of why the SS model shows no 
response or a countercyclical response to a productivity shock while the RBC model results in a 
procyclical labor response. The RBC decision function for all polices shows that the optimal 
labor choice is increasing in positive deviations in the current productivity level (procyclical) but 
is decreasing in capital stock deviations; that is, the residual effect of past productivity levels 
(see the last decision function in Table 5). (The latter effect occurs because elevated capital 
stocks invoke elevated consumption, which reduces the marginal value of income and hence the Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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marginal benefit of labor.)  However, even once we consider the indirect effect (through capital) 
of a one-time shock on labor in the RBC model, the immediate effect is still procyclical. In 
Figure 2 we depict the RBC model response to a one-time, transitory productivity shock (see the 
path of Θ). In the top panel, while labor clearly follows the direction of the shock, note that the 
long-term response eventually becomes negative as the procyclical direct effect of the deviation 
in productivity decays faster than the negative indirect effect of the capital stock.  
In the bottom panel of Figure 2 we see what drives the labor effect through an 
examination of choice variables as shares of output. Recall from the SS model (see Equation 
(13)) that labor is either countercyclical because the consumption share c is procyclical (cap 
policy) or invariant to the shock because c is constant (all other policies). In contrast, under the 
long-horizon, transitory shock setting of the RBC model, the consumption share falls while the 
investment share rises in response to a positive shock. The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows this 
relationship for the intensity target policy, though a similar relationship holds for each policy we 
consider. When shocks are transitory, a positive shock leads to a greater relative response in 
investment versus consumption (though consumption is elevated). In the tension between a 
marginal productivity of labor increase and marginal value of income decrease that determines 
the labor response to shocks, it is the former that dominates in the RBC model, leading to a 
procyclical response, at least in the short run.  
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Figure 2. Example Response to One-Standard-Deviation Productivity Shock under 
Intensity Target Policy. Top panel: impulse responses in percentage deviation from 
steady state. Bottom panel: percentage deviation of output shares from steady state. 




























































































































Sensitivity Analysis: Productivity Growth 
Recall from the baseline results discussed above that even though the intensity target is 
preferred to the cap and tax in terms of the steady-state utility level, when we consider the 
present value of utility over the entire horizon, starting from the steady state under no policy 
constraint, the tax is preferred; it is closely followed by the cap. From a long-run, present-value 
perspective, then, transitions during which the capital level is diminished toward the new steady 
state can be important. Although our baseline model abstracts from productivity growth, it is 
reasonable to suppose that such growth might influence the nature of the transition and therefore 
affect how instruments perform. To explore this possibility, we incorporate labor-augmenting, 
technological progress into the model: Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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where ρ is equal to one plus the growth rate of labor productivity, which we set to equal 3.47 
percent. This level achieves an intended 2 percent rate of overall growth (1.0347
(1-α-γ) = 1.02) 
which is the average per capita growth rate over the past 50 years (Brock and Taylor 2008). The 
only other parameter adjustment is to the rate of depreciation, which falls from 0.096 to 0.076 
when accounting for a 2 percent rate of overall growth. We then solve for the balanced growth 
path (BGP) where, in the deterministic case, all variables except for labor and emissions grow at 
the constant rate of 1–ρ (i.e., 0.0347). To ensure existence of the BGP, it is necessary to assume 
that abatement technology improves at a rate equal to overall growth—that is, emissions per unit 
of M fall over time at the rate of growth. We address this strong assumption, and the possibility 
of avoiding it, in our discussion of future research directions below.  
As expected, incorporating productivity growth shortens the transition, in this case from 
the no policy BGP to the new BGP for each policy. Although the tax’s advantage over the cap is 
diminished somewhat, the ordering based on the present value of utility from the no-growth 
setting is maintained.  
Overall, after economic growth is incorporated into the model, decision functions show 
that choice variables are less sensitive to capital deviations and, except for labor, more sensitive 
to deviations in the productivity factor. In other words, the direct effects of innovations to the 
productivity factor are greater while the indirect effect of all past productivity deviations on 
investment and consumption, as manifested in the capital stock, is diminished. The intuition for 
this result is that accounting for growth effectively discounts the future marginal value of income 
(shadow value of the income constraint). However, the degree of these differences is minor. 
Other than a diminished transition and a small degree of convergence in the mean present value 
of utility across instruments, there is no significant change in qualitative results vis-à-vis the no-
growth setup.  
Sensitivity Analysis: Developing-Country Volatility and Risk Aversion 
Given the systematic differences in the volatility of key variables between policies, it is 
natural to ask to what degree this second-order stochastic relationship translates into a direct 
preference on expected utility grounds, given preferences with some degree of risk aversion.  In 
particular, to what degree might the cap policy uniquely generate a benefit in terms of reduced 
volatility? Barlevy (2004) provides a useful survey of the benefits of economic stabilization and 
the welfare costs of business cycles. The importance of these deviations from stable growth is Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
22 
debatable; arguments range from Lucas’s (1987) conclusion that they are a small concern to 
Storesletten et al.’s (2001) estimation that lifetime consumption costs of volatility are as high as 
7.4 percent for individuals without savings.   
Recall that although the cap policy features the lowest volatility, its utility advantage over 
the tax for a given period on average was not significant (Table 6) and not sufficient to outweigh 
the advantage of the tax over the transition to a new steady state. Failure to find a significant 
stabilization benefit to the cap policy might reflect low variability in innovations to the shock 
process, low risk aversion in the assumed utility function, or both. We explore the effect of an 
increase in the standard deviation of productivity factor innovation process, (Equation (16)) 
which also reflects the standard manner in which RBC models for developing countries typically 
differ in their parameterization (e.g., Neumeyer and Perri 2005). The issue of volatility and 
stabilization is particularly important for emerging economies. Pallage and Robe (2003, abstract) 
argue that “in many poor countries, the welfare gain from eliminating volatility may in fact 
exceed the welfare gain from an additional percentage point of growth forever.”  
Using the midrange estimate from Neumeyer and Perri (2005), based on their analysis of 
Argentinian data as a case study, we adjust the baseline level of σ from 0.014 to 0.0204. We find 
again that the previous ordering based on mean utility in a period is maintained: the intensity 
target performs best, and the cap slightly dominates the tax. As in the baseline setting, given 
transitions, the tax again dominates from a present value perspective, followed by the cap and 
then the intensity target. Simply raising the variance of innovations to the productivity shock 
process fails, in this case, to generate much stronger evidence of a strong stabilization benefit to 
the cap.  
 Next we consider the sensitivity of our results to the degree of risk aversion over 
consumption. Note that our measure of utility over consumption, lnC, is a special case of the 
constant relative risk aversion specification, C
1-ψ/(1-ψ), where the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, ψ, is set to 1. We consider an alternative parameterization with increased risk aversion, 
setting ψ to 2. Contrary to initial expectation, elevating risk aversion over consumption in this 
manner fails to produce a stabilization benefit to utility under the cap. Utility orderings for the 
instruments based on the mean per period and the present value are unchanged. An explanation 
for this effect, at least in part, is found in examining the surprising effect on labor volatility.  
Under increased risk aversion over consumption, there is an increased incentive to avoid 
fluctuations from the steady state in general and to direct fluctuations in income away from 
consumption and into investment. Thus the decision functions show a decrease in the sensitivity Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
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to deviations in the productivity factor and a corresponding increase in sensitivity to capital 
deviations. Given that optimal labor deviations move opposite to capital deviations, the volatility 
of labor is increased. This shift is particularly strong for the cap policy, where the inflexibility of 
choice over M already drives a high relative sensitivity to capital fluctuations. Ultimately, this 
constraint under increased consumption risk aversion leads to a reversal of our earlier finding of 
the cap policy as a stabilizing force: labor volatility under the cap policy is actually slightly 
greater than under the alternatives. Since the baseline utility measure over labor also includes a 
degree of risk aversion, it is not surprising that consumption stabilization benefits under the cap 
may be eroded.     
Conclusion 
Stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere will require dramatic 
reductions in global carbon emissions. The choice among policies should be informed both by 
their expected cost-effectiveness and by how they respond to unexpected events along the path. 
We find that although a cap and a tax can produce equivalent outcomes in expectation, a cap-
and-trade program reduces economic volatility, compared with all other policies and no policy, 
and a tax enhances volatility. The cap functions as an automatic stabilizer, since the shadow 
price of the emissions constraint increases with unexpected increases in productivity and 
decreases with unexpected economic cooling.   
We find that an intensity target does indeed encourage greater economic growth than a 
cap or a tax, since the allocation of additional permits serves as an inducement for additional 
production. Furthermore, it seems neither to dampen nor to exacerbate aspects of the business 
cycle. Although emissions do remain volatile, for a stock pollutant like GHGs, the timing of 
emissions is not generally important. Most of the differences in volatility seem to be rather small, 
given our parameters and policy targets; the notable exception may be labor, which demonstrates 
more than 50 percent greater variance under all other policies relative to the cap in our baseline 
scenario. 
Depending on one’s perspective and priorities, there is reason to prefer each of the 
possible instruments considered here. The intensity target achieves the emissions reduction at the 
lowest welfare cost in the steady state, with no reduction to the labor force. The emissions tax 
achieves the emissions goal with the lowest welfare cost from a present value of utility 
perspective. These results are robust to considerations of developing-country levels of volatility 
in productivity and heightened risk aversion. Finally, the cap achieves the reduction with a 
slightly higher present value welfare cost than the tax but ensures the cut is achieved without lag Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
24 
and features a lower level of labor variance than all other policies considered. However, this 
labor stabilization result does not hold when the volatility of productivity factor innovations is 
raised to a level representative of emerging economies. All of these policies deviate from optimal 
policy, in which both emissions prices and quantities should adjust (procyclically) to 
productivity shocks (Heutel 2008). Although the emissions cap fixes quantities, both the tax and 
the intensity target feature fixed emissions prices. 
In practice, those distinctions may be less important in a more realistic, decentralized 
policy setting. The intensity target may not have the same production incentive effect unless 
actors themselves receive additional allowance allocations in proportion to their output, as with 
tradable performance standards or output-based allocation. However, it does retain the feature of 
allowing emissions levels to rise in an expansion. Meanwhile, commonly proposed cost-
containment features like banking, borrowing, or price caps tend to make the emissions cap 
behave over time more like a tax. These design elements must be considered in weighing the 
macroeconomic trade-offs of the different policies.  
In future work we intend to extend the analysis using a more computationally intensive 
but flexible backward induction solution approach to relax certain model constraints on the 
results presented here. Our solution approach of linearizing around the steady state precludes the 
consideration of policy anticipation, ratcheting policy stringency over time, and more realistic 
models of abatement efficiency growth. The steady-state technique is not suited for anticipation 
of the onset of a policy by economic agents, which would affect the dynamics of the transition 
path. A dynamic policy ramp, where emissions constraints are ratcheted over time, is better 
captured by a nonsteady-state approach. Finally, when extended to consider the role of economic 
growth, the linearization technique requires strong assumptions about the rate of improvement in 
abatement technology—namely, that it is equal to the rate of productivity growth. Next steps to 
advance this analysis should include decoupling productivity and abatement technology and 
providing greater flexibility in policy format and agent expectations overall. 
 
 Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
25 
References 
Aldy, J.E., E. Ley, and I.W.H. Parry. 2008. A Tax-Based Approach to Slowing Global Climate 
Change. National Tax Journal, 61: 493–518. 
Barlevy, G. 2004. The Cost of Business Cycles and the Benefits of Stabilization: A Survey. 
NBER Working Paper W10926. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
EconomicResearch. 
Brock, W.A., and M.S. Taylor. 2008. Economic Growth and the Environment: A Review of 
Theory and Empirics. In P. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic 
Growth. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1749–821. 
Dissou, Y. 2005. Cost-effectiveness of the Performance Standard System to Reduce CO2 
Emissions in Canada: A General Equilibrium Analysis. Resource and Energy Economics 
27(3) (October): 187–207. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2004. Annual Energy Review 2004. DOE/EIA-
0384(2004), July 2005. Washington, DC: Department of Energy. 
Fischer, C. 2003. Combining Rate-Based and Cap-and-Trade Emissions Policies. Climate Policy 
(3S2): S89–S109. 
Fischer, C., and A.K. Fox. 2007. Output-Based Allocation of Emissions Permits for Mitigating 
Tax and Trade Interactions. Land Economics 83: 575–99. 
Goulder, L.H., I. Parry, R. Williams III, and D. Burtraw. 1999. The Cost-Effectiveness of 
Alternative Instruments for Environmental Protection in a Second-Best Setting. Journal 
of Public Economics 72(3): 329–60. 
Herzog, T., K.A. Baumert and J. Pershing. 2006. Target: Intensity – an Analysis of Greenhouse 
Gas Intensity Targets. WRI Report. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. 
Heutel, G. 2008. How Should Environmental Policy Respond to Business Cycles? Optimal 
Policy under Persistent Productivity Shocks. Manuscript. Greensboro, NC: Bryan School 
of Business and Economics, University of North Carolina. 
Jensen, J., and T.N. Rasmussen. 2000. Allocation of CO2 Emission Permits: A General 
Equilibrium Analysis of Policy Instruments. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 40: 111–36. Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
26 
Jotzo, F., and J.C.V. Pezzey. 2007. Optimal Intensity Targets for Emissions Trading under 
Uncertainty. Environmental and Resource Economics 83: 280–86. 
King, R.G., C.I. Plosser, and S. Rebelo. 1988. Production, Growth and Business Cycles: I. The 
Basic Neoclassical Model. Journal of Monetary Economics 21: 195–232.Kolstad, C.D. 
2005. The simple analytics of greenhouse gas emission intensity reduction targets. 
Energy Policy 33: 2231–2236. 
Lucas, Robert. 1987. Models of Business Cycles. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
National Income and Productivity Tables (NIPA). 2005. National Economic Accounts, Tables 
6.2A-D. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb. Accessed July 2005. 
Neumeyer, P.A., and F. Perri. 2005. Business Cycles in Emerging Economies: The Role of 
Interest Rates. Journal of Monetary Economics 52(2): 345–80. 
Newell, R.G., and W.A. Pizer. 2008. Indexed Regulation. NBER Working Paper 13991. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.  
Pallage, S., and M.A. Robe. 2003. On the Welfare Cost of Economic Fluctuations in Developing 
Countries. International Economic Review 44(2): 677–98. 
Parry, I.W.H., and R.C. Williams. 1999. Second-Best Evaluation of Eight Policy Instruments to 
Reduce Carbon Emissions. Resource and Energy Economics 21: 347–73. 
Peterson, S. 2008. Intensity targets: implications for the economic uncertainties of emissions 
trading. In B. Hansjürgens and R. Antes (eds.), Economics and Management of Climate 
Change: Risks, Mitigation and Adaptation. New York: Springer, 97-110. 
Pizer, W.A. 2005. The Case for Intensity Targets. Climate Policy 5(4): 455–62.  
Prescott, E.C.F. 1986. Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement. Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis Quarterly Review 10: 9–22. 
Quirion, P. 2005. Does Uncertainty Justify Intensity Emission Caps. Resource and Energy 
Economics 27: 343–53.  
Storesletten, K., C. Telmer, and A. Yaron. 2001. The Welfare Cost of Business Cycles Revisited: 
Finite Lives and Cyclical Variation in Idiosyncratic Risk. European Economic Review 
45(7): 1311–39. Resources for the Future  Fischer and Springborn 
27 
Sue Wing, I., A.D. Ellerman, and J.M. Song. 2009. Absolute vs. Intensity Limits for CO2 
Emission Control: Performance Under Uncertainty. In H. Tulkens and R. Guesnerie 
(eds.), The Design of Climate Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 221–52. 
Weitzman, M.L. 1974. Prices vs. Quantities. Review of Economic Studies 41: 477–91. 
 